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Abstract: This article aims to interpret Leibniz’s dynamics project (circa 1678–
1700) through a theory of the causation of corporeal motion. It presents an inter-
pretation of the dynamics that characterizes physical causation as the structural 
organization of phenomena. The measure of living force (vis viva) by mv2 must 
then be understood as an organizational property of motion conceptually dis-
tinct from the geometrical or otherwise quantitative magnitudes exchanged in 
mechanical phenomena. To defend this view, we examine one of the most impor-
tant theoretical discrepancies of Leibniz’s dynamics with classical mechanics, 
the measure of vis viva as mv2 rather than ½ mv2. This “error”, resulting from the 
limits of Leibniz’s methodology, reveals the systematic role of this quantity mv2 in 
the dynamics. In examining the evolution of the quantity mv2 in the refinement 
of the force concept (vis) from potentia to actio, I argue that Leibniz’s systematic 
limitations help clarify dynamical causality as neither strictly metaphysical nor 
mechanical but a distinct level of reality to which Leibniz dedicates the “dynam-
ica” as “nova scientia”.
1  Introduction
Although a physical theory of corporeal motion was of central concern to Leibniz 
in his youth, leading him, under Cartesian, and more importantly, Hobbesian 
inspiration, to compose the two part Hypothesis Physica Nova (circa 1671), his 
mathematical maturation in Paris (1672–1676) provided a new stage for these 
investigations. What began in the late 1670s as a refutation and reform of Car-
tesian laws of motion and collision grew into what we can retrospectively call a 
dynamics project terminating around 1700 when Leibniz ceased active work on 
the subject. The term “dynamics” understood as a “new science” was first pri-
vately used in a letter to Bodenhausen in 1689 during his year-long voyage to 
Italy and first publically presented in De primae philosophiae emendatione et de 
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notione substantiae in 1694.1 By the time of the publication of Specimen Dynami-
cum in 1695 and De Ipsa Natura in 1698, it is clear that Leibniz had a mature and 
systematic understanding of dynamics, and employed its basic ideas to argue for a 
metaphysics of corporeal substances.2 The Essay de Dynamique (circa 1699–1701) 
represents the last of Leibniz’s systematic attempts to present the dynamics.3
In the roughly bidecennial dynamics project from 1676–1700, filled with 
detours and missteps, Leibniz was faced not only with the task of reworking a 
theory of motion through the critique of the Cartesian position but also forced to 
provide it with a new systematic foundation. Although much has been made of 
this period of Leibniz’s natural philosophy where he attempted to reinvent cor-
poreal substance through a quasi-scholastic notion of substantial forms, the key 
motor pushing Leibniz along this path, the problem of physical causality, has 
received much less attention.4
My contribution to current debate on this aspect of Leibniz’s interpretation is 
to provide an alternative interpretation of this main feature of Leibniz’s dynam-
ics project, with resonances in its accompanying metaphysics, as the refinement 
of a theory of structural causality. In the limited context of this article, I aim to 
provide grounds for interpreting Leibniz’s dynamics as the development of a 
theory of structural causality. By “structural causality” I mean that the relation-
ship of dynamical causation to empirical motion is a relationship between two 
strata of reality: a stratum of force and a stratum of (locomotive) phenomena. 
This should not be understood in terms of an isomorphic mapping of one stratum 
to another. Rather, as I shall argue, dynamical causes are expressed through the 
properties of a physical system, taken as a whole, rather than through properties 
of individual bodies or their mechanical relation with other individual bodies. 
To take one of Leibniz’s analogies, just as the Apollonian cone expresses a con-
tinuous multiplicity of curves, dynamical cause, vis viva, expresses a system of 
phenomena. This form of causality is termed “structural” because the effects of 
this cause (force qua cause) pertain to the distribution of proportional quantities 
(a system of effects) found in empirical motion.
1 GP IV 469.
2 This is the explicit central argument of “De Ipsa Natura”. GP IV 504–516; AG 155–167.
3 GM VI 215–231, A. Robinet, Architectonique disjunctive, automates systémiques, et idéalité dans 
l’œuvre de G. W. Leibniz, Paris, 1986, 266  f. François Duchesneau, La Dynamique de Leibniz, Paris 
1994, 244.
4 Jeffrey McDonough is one of the few interpreters who has been developing a systematic 
account of Leibniz’s theory of causality, although he develops this from optics rather than a close 
reading of Leibnizian dynamics. See Jeffrey McDonough, “Leibniz’s Two Realms Revisited”, Noûs 
42, 2008, 673–696.
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The thesis of structural causation cannot be fully defended here and I aim 
only to provide some grounds for such a reading. However, some implications of 
this thesis are directly relevant for the analysis below. Most importantly, it frames 
the meaning of what it is for force (vis) to cause motion. That is, to assert that vis 
viva is the cause of motion is to say that vis viva structures the many groups of 
internally related and proportional phenomenal expressions of motion. Leibniz’s 
mature metaphysical thesis of the non-interaction of substances and the more 
well-known anti-realism and relationalism concerning motion are related facets 
of this idea of structural causality. This means, above all, that Leibniz’s concep-
tion of the cause of motion cannot be reduced to empirical factors understood 
along the model of efficient cause. This efficient causation model provides, at 
best, an account of the sequence of effects (the phenomenal properties of motion) 
rather than causes. Even as Leibniz continues to provide room for explanation by 
means of efficient (contact) causation, the scientific reduction of efficient causal-
ity to dynamical reality was aimed at providing a foundation for natural science 
by separating an infra- or non-phenomenal reality of dynamics from an empiri-
cal-phenomenal reality of effects (extended motion).
To be clear, I ultimately hold that the causal nature of Leibnizian vis should 
not be understood in terms of the operational powers involved in the interaction 
between moving bodies but should rather be seen as a higher-order, and hence 
structural, property of systems of bodies. Causality is structural when what causes 
and what is caused constitute two levels of reality. Leibnizian vires are causes and 
extended phenomena are effects. Although Leibniz does employ the term “struc-
tura systematis” explicitly in order to avoid a theory “that follow[s] per se from 
the bare laws of motion derived from geometry,” my use of structural cause is not 
itself an explicit aspect of Leibniz’s work.5 For Leibniz’s own use of the term, he 
opposes the reduction of the laws of motion to “pure geometry” (extension) with 
a systematic structure, but does not provide a more concrete elaboration of what 
is precisely “structural” in this causal account. What comes closest to an explicit 
statement of structural causality in Leibniz is found in the maturation of Leibniz’s 
natural science where he attempts to reintroduce final causes into the treatment 
of physical laws selon les modernes. This explicit use of final causes is given as a 
parallel mode of explanation to efficient causes in his argument for an interpene-
trating and compatible reign of two kingdoms, the kingdom of power (efficient 
cause) and the kingdom of wisdom (final cause).6 Leibniz here understands the 
interpenetrating reign of the two kingdoms as different aspects of the same reality 
5 Emphasis original. GM VI 241; AG 124.
6 GM VI 242  f.; AG 126.
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yet certainly prioritizes the kingdom of wisdom in its determining role in explain-
ing and formalizing the phenomenal expression of efficient causality.7 In this, 
Leibniz thinks of efficient cause as a parallel yet secondary feature of the primary 
determination already laid out by final causes such that once the “general and 
distant” principles have been established, it need not be constantly referred to.8
Of course Leibniz until the very end of his life maintained a mechanistically 
informed account of corporeal motion. He unequivocally claims in his fifth letter 
to Clarke that “A body is never moved naturally, except by another body which 
touches or pushes it […].  Any other kind of operation on bodies is either miracu-
lous or imaginary.”9 Of course the two kingdoms of wisdom and power provide 
different explicatae for the same explicans and the phenomenon of contact can be 
taken as a necessary condition for motion’s well-foundedness rather than its ulti-
mate cause. The difficult explication of the compatibility between these two king-
doms of wisdom and power is not my task here but a basic hierarchy certainly 
exists between them. That is, we know that the key metaphysical thesis that forms 
the root of the dynamics project as well as much of the systematic metaphysics 
of the mature Leibniz is the basic idea that “principles of corporeal nature and 
of mechanics itself are more metaphysical than geometrical, and belong to some 
indivisible forms or nature as the causes of appearances, rather than to corpo-
real mass or extension.”10 Extended motion is thus in principle phenomenal and 
hence imaginary, as Leibniz often emphasizes, although certain conditions allow 
us to qualify them as “well-founded”.11
We also see the hierarchy of the two kingdoms at work in Leibniz’s theory of 
optics where the Cartesian theory, based on an efficient cause model of the hard-
ness of the medium and the elasticity of light particles, is rejected in favor of a teleo-
logical model of optimized geometrical proportions.12 Despite this, Leibniz does not 
reject efficient causality but allows a “higher” determination through teleology to 
explain the mechanical or empirical level of reality. As such, my attribution of struc-
tural causality to Leibniz may be unfortunately misunderstood as an equivocation 
between an epistemological level determining natural laws, or their reason (ratio), 
and the ontic level of the constitution of their cause (causa). Indeed this identity of 
ratio and causa is an inherent problem for any theory of final causality in natural 
7 GP VII 279.
8 GM VI 242  f.; AG 126.
9 Leibniz 5th letter to Clarke, 18 August, 1716, § 35; GP VII 398; L 702. Cf. “Antibarbarus Physicus”, 
GP VII 338; AG 313.
10 GP VII 440; AG 52.
11 GP VII 564; L 548.
12 GP VII 274; L 479.
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science and this mode of reasoning was indeed the target of the famous rejection 
of final cause by the partisans of the “new science” from Descartes onwards. None-
theless Cartesians and other mechanists also faced a version of this problem in 
reducing the ratio of corporeal motion to causa efficiens where the divine would 
inevitably have to be invoked to explain this “explanation” for physical causation.
Outside of our immediate context, we should also note that the Leibnizian 
legacy of final cause that eventually contributed to development of the principle of 
least action in the work of Maupertuis, Euler and Lagrange became stripped of its 
metaphysical sense and instrumentalized without much need for the metaphys-
ics of substance that accompanied such a notion.13 Whereas mechanists such as 
Boyle famously articulated a place for final causes as an extrinsic and extra-sci-
entific level of accounting for the laws of nature, Leibniz not only insisted but 
became more and more convinced of the immanence of final causes within phys-
ical reality as a fruitful means for a scientific treatment of the nature of corporeal 
substances.14 This immanence of teleology in corporeal substance is no doubt 
one of the key dimensions of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics. As such, at least for 
Leibniz, the dangers of epistemological and metaphysical equivocation inherent 
in the assertion of final causality remain certainly problematic in general but are 
nonetheless an inevitable feature of Leibniz’s approach.
Any general discussion of final causes and the kingdom of wisdom can 
ultimately be reduced to an argument about the “best of all possible worlds”, 
but this metaphysical understanding cannot be adequate for Leibniz’s concrete 
treatment of dynamical causality. That is, the application of final causality to 
natural science always requires an analogical structural concept for the form of 
“harmony” at stake in nature.15 A particularly alluring example of this is Leibniz’s 
letter to De Volder from 21 January 1704 where he makes an analogous use of 
number series, say for example the Leibniz series for π, to describe the evolution 
of (derivative) forces under the invariant of a conserved primitive force.16 In this 
argument, primitive force is “pregnant” or “preinvolved”, as Leibniz likes to say, 
with the totality of its discrete moments of evolution (the instances of derivative 
force in a motion) just as a law of the series gives the n-th term of its expansion. 
This analogical suggestion also seems to resonate with his work on optics such as 
the Tentamen Anagogicum as well as his famous criticisms of Descartes’ laws of 
collision in Animadversiones in partem generalem Principiorum Cartesianorum. In 
13 Cf. Boudri 2002, 126–133.
14 See the discussion in the Theodicy, GP VI 321 as well as Osler 1996, 388–407.
15 Leibniz provides a general presentation of this bridge between harmony and geometric order 
in “Quid sit idea”, A VI, iv, 1370; GP VI 263; L 207.
16 GP II 262; DeV 452.
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both of these key cases, Leibniz’s arguments do not privilege empirical adequacy, 
although verificationally useful, but draw primarily on structural features (like 
optimization, in the case of optics, and continuity in the case of collision) of the 
proportions resulting from the provided measurements. My thesis of structural 
causation is thus metaphysically reducible, like any instance of final cause, to a 
general discussion of the “best of all possible worlds”. Yet insofar as principles 
are empty without concrete instances, this metaphysical thesis has no meaning 
in Leibniz’s dynamics other than structural causation.
Taking up the immanent features of Leibniz’s dynamics and leaving aside the 
broader metaphysical problems, in what follows I defend this principle of struc-
tural causality through the mathematical structure of the dynamics. If dynamic 
causality is structural then the mathematics of the dynamics would not only 
reflect this structure but also demonstrate the irreducibility of this structure to 
more basic empirical factors. More precisely, as the mathematical structure of the 
dynamics is centered on the conservation of vis viva, expressed quantitatively as 
the invariance of mv2 in motion, I argue that understanding the role of this quan-
tity in Leibnizian dynamics demands an understanding of cause as structural. In 
doing so I show that what Leibniz reveals in the concrete context of his methods 
of measurement and the treatment of dynamic causality is often more enlighten-
ing than what he explicitly remarks about them.
2  The Measurement of vis viva and its 
Conservation
In order to grasp the structural character of dynamical causality, we need first 
to be explicit about the limitations and shifts in Leibniz’s measurement of vis 
viva through the quantity mv2. We know that this quantity, borrowed from the 
work of his mentor Huygens, provided the cornerstone for his eventual dynamics 
project and remained a constant in his dynamics project from his first attempt at 
a treatise in the 1678 De Corporum Concursu until his final works on the subject.17 
Nonetheless, there are in fact two different problems in evaluating the role of 
this quantity in Leibniz’s work. The first concerns measurement and corresponds 
to the problem of how Leibniz justified this quantity mv2 as the measure of vis 
viva. The second concerns Leibniz’s concept of the conservation of this quan-
17 Christiaan Huygens, “The motion of colliding bodies”, trans. Richard J. Blackwell, Isis, Vol. 
68, No. 4, Dec., 1977, 574–597.
Brought to you by | University of Bristol
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/24/19 1:00 PM
 Potentia, actio, vis: the Quantity mv2 and its Causal Role   417
tity and corresponds to the conceptual relation between the quantity conserved, 
namely mv2, and the proportional relation between the conserved quantity, mass 
and velocity. By distinguishing between these two problems, we move closer to 
understanding how Leibniz’s limitations in the measurement can help clarify the 
concept of causality intended by the conservation of vis viva.
Starting with the first problem of measurement, we examine how Leibniz 
accounts for the measurement of vis viva as mv2. It is important to note that 
although vis viva directly translates to “living force”, the notion is not what we 
canonically understand by “force”. In the history of mechanics the uses of the 
term “vis” as “force”, “Kraft”, “power” (potentia) or “pressure” remained vague 
from the 17th to the 19th century. As a sufficiently generalized and completed 
formalization of classical mechanics was only accomplished in the 19th century, 
ambiguity regarding the referents of “force”, “energy” and “work” as well as their 
systematic relations should not surprise us.18 Our standard classical-Newtonian 
term “force” F refers to F=m·a (where m stands for mass and a for acceleration). 
Force also possesses, in the classical understanding, both scalar (the magnitude 
of force) and vector (F=ma) expressions, which are not in the Leibnizian under-
standing of vis viva. Hence although Leibniz uses the term vis here, we should 
clarify that the following uses of vis (vis viva, vis mortua, vis activa primitiva, etc.) 
should not be confused with force as we understand it in its standard use.19 Leib-
nizian vis should then be understood independently and only analogically with 
another fundamental concept in classical mechanics, i.  e. work.
Thinking of vis in analogy to work, or the quantity energy-work, allows us to 
step directly into Leibniz’s own account of the measurement of vis.20 It is worth 
recalling here that Leibniz’s initial entry into the dynamics project was moti-
vated by the attempt to “reform” Cartesian-styled mechanics by refuting the con-
servation of the quantity of motion mv in nature. This refutation of mv as con-
served quantity is probably the most famous single aspect of Leibniz’s dynamics, 
repeated in general metaphysical works like the 1686 Discours de Métaphysique 
(§ 17  f.). However, as early as January 1678, in an early treatise De Corporum Con-
cursu, Leibniz had already argued, in view of the perceived error of the Cartesians,
I now see where the error is to be found. The force in bodies should not be estimated [aesti-
manda est] from speed and the size of bodies but from the height from which it falls. Hence 
18 See Elkana 1974, 22–51.
19 In the following all references to Leibnizian “force” will be made by the use of the term “vis” 
while “force” will refer to the general classical-Newtonian concept.
20 Rene Dugas provides the standard account of Leibnizian vis viva as energy and provides an 
account of the quantity in classical-Newtonian terms. See Dugas 1955, 219–221.
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the heights from which bodies fall are as [a proportion of] the square roots of the speeds in 
question. […] Thus generally, the vires are in a ratio composed of the simple product of the 
bodies and the square of the speeds.21
Indeed by 1678 the quantity mv2 was already a systematic part of Leibniz’s treat-
ment of body, motion and vis. Of course the origin of this very quantity comes 
from his mentor Huygens who had in 1669 already published his argument for 
the conservation of mv2 in the British Royal Society’s Philosophical Transac-
tions. Henry Oldenburg, the founding secretary of the Royal Society, had invited 
J. Wallis, C. Wren and C. Huygens to publish on the conservation of mv, m|v| and 
mv2 in order to settle the conservation controversy, and this publication was read 
by a young Leibniz in early 1670’s while still in Mainz.22 It is however important 
to note that while the original Huygensian context remained squarely limited to 
the problem of the laws of (elastic) collision, aimed against the Cartesian formu-
lation, Leibniz sought to extend and generalize this conservation principle as the 
quantity conserved in nature as such.23
Although Leibniz’s systematic development of the concept of vis had only 
begun in earnest during the late 1670’s and thus lacking in its eventual meta-
physical and scientific sophistication, we can already identify the continuity of 
his justification for the quantity mv2 in this early work with the later. Here we first 
look at the “negative” argument for the conservation of mv2 and then turn to the 
“positive” argument in order to grasp what is at stake in the transition between 
different uses for this same quantity.
The first, negative argument, remains in the mode of a refutation of the Car-
tesian quantity mv.24 This is notably found in Leibniz’s 1685 Brevis Demonstratio 
erroris memorabilis Cartesii and repeated in the 1686 Discours de Métaphysique 
(§ 17  f.). In both accounts Leibniz considers two bodies A and B with masses of one 
unit and four units raised to four units length and one unit length, respectively. 
We notice that the heights and masses are inversely proportional. Leibniz argues 
to establish a quantity, call this w, as the same quantity needed (quanta opus) 
21 [Author’s translation] Leibniz, “De Corporum Concursu”. In Fichant 1994, 134.
22 Cf. Aiton 1985, 30 and Beeley 2004, 47–73, 55.
23 See C. Huygens 1977, 574–597, as well as Erlichson 1997, 149–154.
24 Although the distinction between speed and velocity plays a role in the 17th century, they do 
not play a particular role in Leibniz’s work even in his critique of Cartesian laws of motion and 
collision. Due to the uses of these terms in the cited texts, this article will use these terms without 
particular distinction. The exception will be in my account of Leibniz’s argument in Figure 2, 
where velocities are represented by positive and negative quantities.
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to carry (elevandum) the two bodies to their respective heights.25 We might ana-
logically understand this as work and insofar as the heights and the masses are 
inversely proportional, the work is the same to elevate (under similar conditions) 
both bodies to their respective heights. Now Leibniz does not give an explicit 
reason for why this quanta opus w is equal in both cases of elevation but assumes 
that readers understand this to be the case. From statics we can understand the 
two bodies with their respective inversely proportional weights and distances 
to be in equilibrium. This results from the consideration that their heights are 
inversely proportional to the ratio of the mass A and B. As such the notion of con-
servation at work here is the result of a statical consideration of the two bodies 
with respect to the ratio of mass and height. To say that the “quantity needed” to 
raise body A one foot and body B four feet is equivalent to simply saying that the 
body A and body B at their respective heights are in equilibrium.
To refute the Cartesians, Leibniz argues that this same conserved quanta 
opus w will be conserved in some way in the fall of each body A and B from their 
respective heights. The refutation is simple. Appealing to Galileo’s law of falling 
bodies, the refutation follows simply by noting that the final speed of the falling 
body is independent of the mass of the body but dependent on the duration (pro-
portional to height) of free fall. Hence, the body falling from the greater height, 
B, will endure a longer duration of fall and hence achieve a greater final speed. 
Leibniz’s argument is simply that as the final speeds of each falling body are 
proportional to their heights and not their masses, the original quanta opus w, 
posited as the quantity needed to carry the two bodies to their respective heights 
is not conserved by mv, the product of the quantity of mass and final speed. 
That is:
w = mass·unit of height, or, w = m·h,26
wA = 1·4 = 4
wB = 4·1 = 4
And if we calculate for the Cartesian quantity of motion = m·v (bulk·speed) and we assume 
through an analogue of Galileo’s law that v (at the base of fall) = √(2·h)27 we get:
vA = √(2·4)=√8
vB = √(2·1)=√2
Hence for mv we get:
25 A VI 4, 2027–2030. Cf. A VI 4, 1556–1558.
26 The gravitational constant is not included here as a factor of the quantity for work or free fall 
due to the fear of anachronism.
27 Leibniz interprets Cartesian bulk as mass in many of his demonstrations. Although the con-
cept of mass was not yet fully developed, Leibniz does understand it as the product of volume 
and density. GM VI 298  f.
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mvA = 1·√8 = √8 = 2√2; or the quantity of motion of A
mvB = 4·√2 = 4√2 = 4√2; or the quantity of motion of B
and thus mv(A)/mv(B) = ½
We also note that the same example, calculated for mv2, results in the following:
mv2A = 1·8 = 8
mv2B = 4·2 = 8
As we know, the quantity of motion mv, interpreted as momentum, is indeed con-
served but this quantity is not conserved in this example across the two bodies 
as gravity accelerates the body in free fall. Whether we understand the Cartesian 
quantity of motion mv as momentum or not, it is indeed different from the quan-
tity w. Leibniz understood the problem differently. His refutation of Descartes is 
established insofar as the quantity of motion of A and B are different despite the 
equivalence of the quantity necessary to raise them to the height of 4 feet and 1 
foot, respectively. It is for this reason that the fundamental concept of conserva-
tion in Leibniz is most closely related to energy-work.
Now the context of Leibniz’s argument here was aimed at making a more 
general metaphysical claim. Leibniz’s work on the reform of Cartesian mechan-
ics in the 1670’s had clearly evolved into an outright rejection of the metaphys-
ical foundations of the latter’s natural science. The refutation of the quantity of 
motion mv had evolved into a rejection of the more general Cartesian thesis of 
the reducibility of corporeality and corporeal motion to size, shape and motion, 
that is, a rejection of the mechanistic foundations of natural science.28 Hence, 
Leibniz’s argument here should be understood, following commentators such 
as Lodge, as arguing, not primarily for the conservation of mv2, but rather the 
inadequacy of mv as a measurement for the quantity conserved in nature.29 The 
“negative” nature of such an argument is aimed at heuristically arguing for a dif-
ferent scientific foundation that turns toward understanding motion in terms of 
its cause qua vis than establishing the quantity mv2 as such. Ultimately Leibniz 
would have made the same metaphysical claim even if mv4 or mv3 or some other 
quantity were indeed conserved. In essence all Leibniz needed to provide was a 
principle of conservation that was not mv. The refutation of the conservation of 
mv was the occasion to make a larger metaphysical point about the inadequacy of 
the reduction of bodies to extension.
Bracketing the larger metaphysical issue, we see that the role played by mv2 
here only serves to introduce a problem of the distinction between the Cartesian 
quantity of motion and the quantity conserved in nature. Indeed, the conserva-
28 GP VII 280–283; AG 245–250.
29 Cf. Lodge 1997, 116–124.
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tion principle that Leibniz intends exploits the ratio between the final velocity of 
the falling body and the work needed to lift the body up to its respective height. 
Interpreting the example in analogy with the conservation of energy-work, the 
Cartesian conservation of the quantity of motion is clearly inadequate. This is 
perhaps indeterminate for ultimately judging between the two thinkers, because 
Descartes is understood by Leibniz to be in the business of measuring the work 
of a system and it is not at all clear that such an interpretation is fair. Of course, 
the referents of these different sorts of quantities (energy, work, force) had not 
yet been stabilized and Leibniz’s criticisms of Descartes can easily be understood 
as a conflict over the referent of distinct conservation principles. This ambiguity 
certainly echoes what D’Alembert would later call “a dispute of words”.30
In order to draw something out from this ambiguity, we turn to the second 
problem concerning the quantity mv2, that of a concept of conservation drawn 
from the proportional relations to velocity and mass. We examine this through 
a “positive” argument for mv2 as articulated in Leibniz’s later work such as the 
1695 Specimen Dynamicum. This “positive” argument also includes a criticism of 
Descartes but is more ambitious in providing a direct account of the structural 
features of this quantity in the account of vis. The argument once again relies on 
the inference, seen already in De Corporum Concursu, from Galileo’s law of falling 
bodies correlating the height of the falling body with the square of the final vel-
ocity of fall. A span of ten years exists between Brevis demonstratio and Specimen 
but I refer to the argument in Specimen for the sake of its simplicity rather than 
provide a larger developmental account.
Unlike his earlier example in Brevis Demonstratio and Discours de Méta-
physique, Leibniz’s example in the Specimen echoes his earlier work in De Cor-
porum Concursu insofar as a pendulum (rather than a simple falling body) is also 
employed. The idea in the Specimen as well as in De Corporum Concursu is simply 
that a pendulum allows us to demonstrate conservation by isolating a determi-
nate ratio between the height attained by the pendulum bob and its maximum 
speed at the base. In the Specimen, Leibniz argues that two pendulums, side by 
side, of equal mass, A and C, will present maximum speeds proportional to their 
respective maximum heights.31 Again, with respect to each pendulum, Leibniz 
employs the proportion of height to square of velocity drawn from his understand-
ing of Galileo’s law. In this example, Leibniz varies the velocity of each pendulum 
30 See Hankins 1990, 207. Although the work of many historians of science like Hankins have 
shown D’Alembert’s judgment here to be rather hasty with respect to the eventual developments 
of the vis viva controversy in the 18th century, this problem of terminological confusion does 
indeed apply to the conflict between Leibniz and the Cartesians.
31 GM VI 245; AG 128.
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A and C with equal mass. Pendulum A with velocity of 1 unit will attain the height 
of 1 foot and pendulum C with velocity of 2 units will attain the height of 4 feet.32 
Again, we see the direct application of the proportion of height and square of the 
velocity as the main means of calculating these quantities. What is different from 
the previous argument is Leibniz’s aim to establish that the quadratic increase of 
velocity is proportional to the linear increase of height or ∆v2∝∆h. We can extend 
the example such that a third or fourth pendulum with different velocities is com-
pared to the two in Leibniz’s example such that the principle holds.
What is crucial to notice here is that Leibniz argues starting from speed rather 
than work of lifting the mass. Leibniz’s account thus attends to the eventual work 
done in each pendulum given the starting position of the pendulum bob at the 
base possessing a certain (maximum) speed. He then argues for the proportion 
∆v2∝∆h by reasoning that the linear difference of speed between mass A and mass 
C will produce a quadratic difference in “future effect”. That is, he establishes this 
proportion by treating the difference between the work accomplished in A and C 
in terms of their velocities rather than vice versa. As Leibniz remarks to Bayle in a 
letter from 1687, crucial to the dynamics, “[F]orce should not be measured by the 
composition of speed and mass but by future effect. However it seems that force 
or power is something real in the present and the future effect is not.”33 This is 
important as Leibniz’s argument in the Specimen supposes that the speed of the 
pendulum at the base will produce a certain amount of future effect proportional 
to its vis qua mv2 at the height of the swing even though its temporal evolution is 
not taken into account.
With an even cursory understanding of energy-work, Leibniz’s example here 
might appear trivial. That is, it might be inconsequential to contrast the earlier 
example of treating mv2 starting from the point of view of the work done by lifting 
up different masses and the later example of the conservation of energy from the 
perspective of a pendulum’s maximum velocity. Other than the shift from a nega-
tive to a positive form of argumentation, the more important difference however 
is the analysis of motion that this later conservation argument provides. Although 
Leibniz does not go into more detail in the passages of the Specimen, this later 
example provides a key insight into the role played by mv2. Here Leibniz estab-
lishes a description of motion as a function of the conserved quantity mv2. That 
is, Leibniz first establishes the principle ∆v2∝∆h by reasoning from the maximum 
velocity to the total amount of “future effect” that the system is capable of accom-
plishing as this “intensity”, registered as velocity, is exhausted in the upward 
32 GM VI 245; AG 128.
33 GP III 48.
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swing. The crucial difference is that Leibniz does not merely rely on the static 
comparison between the work of raising two masses and comparing their speeds 
at fall but turns to a more dynamic methodology of describing the motion of the 
body in terms of the conserved quantity. Leibniz reasons that ∆v2∝∆h implies that 
mv2 is conserved. This, at least, is Leibniz’s reasoning in this example. We shall 
next look at some problems with this reasoning and move toward establishing the 
limits of Leibniz’s methodology and its insights for grasping the structural nature 
of dynamic causality.
3  Error in Calculation or Systematic Limitation?
The themes surrounding the measurement of vis viva only intimates something of 
a structural understanding of causality. In his criticism of the Cartesians, Leibniz 
relies on a statical methodology to bring together the quantities of maximum 
speed and maximum height. Although a proportion is certainly determined such 
that it establishes a generalized ratio between the linear growth of velocity with 
the quadratic growth of height across systems, it is still not clear in what sense this 
organizational principle is more than mere measurement. The ambiguity here is 
that the pendulum example relies on the idea of an exchange between quantities. 
Velocity transforms into height as this “intensity” is exhausted. This conservation 
rule is established only across different motions, that is, across the comparisons 
of different pendulums with varying maximum velocities and maximum heights. 
Although it served Leibniz’s purposes in the Specimen to present the basics of his 
conservation principle, it is insufficient to isolate the causal principle at work. 
Nonetheless we are given a basic sketch of how conservation is related to the laws 
of motion.
What is inadequate in this account is that the particular effects measured 
in those pendulums implicitly rely on the interpretation of vis viva under the 
model of the power or potentia of a body to bring about a certain effect. Like the 
rebounding of a compressed (or stretched) spring, the maximum height of a pen-
dulum is understood as the effect caused by the exhaustion of the intensity in 
the pendulum’s maximum velocity. Nonetheless in the pendulum example we 
already grasp how Leibniz was informed by a structural understanding of vis viva 
qua cause. With the conservation of mv2, Leibniz was already on a conceptual 
move beyond a reliance on the intensity-extension model measured through stat-
ical means. As we shall examine in the following, although Leibniz still relied on 
a statical method to provide the general proportions between maximum velocity 
(v at lowest point of the pendulum) and maximum height, the linear growth of 
Brought to you by | University of Bristol
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/24/19 1:00 PM
424   Tzuchien Tho
velocity with respect to the quadratic growth of height demonstrates a conser-
vation principle that stepped outside of the confines of a mere equilibrium. As 
such, we will draw attention to the fact that Leibniz’s thinking of vis viva as cause 
(or force as cause) eventually develops beyond the correspondence of cause 
qua potentia (intensity) with effect (extension). In order to grasp the conceptual 
importance here, we must turn to a major problem with this ambiguity of struc-
ture for which the conservation quantity mv2 holds the key: the omission of the ½. 
By making this clear, we will also see why Leibniz’s use of mv2 provides the key for 
the structural notion of vis qua cause of motion.
Our analysis above has made use of the close association of Leibnizian vis, to 
be more precise vis viva, with work-energy, in the immediate context of Leibniz’s 
work and its influence on successive generations in the history of mechanics. 
However it is along this same interpretation that Leibniz’s account here has been 
susceptible to two lines of criticisms. The first line, represented by commentators 
like Iltis, argues quite fairly that Leibniz has not argued for the conservation of 
work-energy but simply assumes it in examples such as the ones above. Leib-
niz’s accounts for mv2 are thus not demonstrations in the strict sense but rather 
examples of the application of mv2 as conserved quantity.34 An important aspect 
of this form of criticism is the fact that Leibniz does not supply much by way 
of arguing for the generalization of such a conservation principle from the case 
of the pendulum swing to other cases like the compressed (or stretched) spring 
or the varieties of collision.35 This is true although defenders of Leibniz on this 
account, like Duchesneau, also compellingly argue that such a demonstration 
would be asking too much of Leibniz as the theoretical and empirical aspects 
of the eventual work-energy theorem came together in a piecemeal fashion such 
that there is simply no reason to suppose that empirical results could give rise 
to the theorem without the prior (and a priori) “faith” in such a conservation 
principle that remained metaphysical in character.36 Nonetheless, this first form 
of criticism can allow us to turn our focus on Leibniz’s methodology. That is, 
Leibniz argues for a mathematical proportion in the conservation of vis viva that 
establishes the relation between a certain kind of work quantity (height in the 
example) and the extended motion of the body (speed in the example). This point 
would be relatively trivial if not for its implications for the mathematical structure 
implied by this idea of conservation at work here.
34 Cf. Iltis 1971, 21–35 and 26.
35 It is true that although Leibniz does not provide a demonstration of this generalization, he 
did explicitly conceive of these cases as equivalent in the 1689 Tentamen de Legibus Naturae 
Mundi. LH 35, 10, 4, f. 1v–4. See Bertoloni Meli’s discussion in Bertoloni Meli 2002, 123  f.
36 Duchesneau 1994, 137.
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The non-triviality of these geometrical proportions between quantities of 
height and speed can be opened up by looking at the second form of criticism 
that Leibniz’s account has traditionally provoked. This criticism more directly 
concerns the question of the omission of the ½ in Leibniz’s vis viva as mv2. Having 
seen where Leibniz gets his quantity mv2, we now look briefly at why energy in 
standard classical mechanics is ½ mv2. The short answer here is the calculus of 
integration which Leibniz certainly had a large role in developing.
The short answer for why energy-work is ½ mv2 then is:
For Energy = E, F = (Newtonian) force, s = displacement, m = mass, a = acceleration and v 
= velocity
Hence if we take energy as the product of force across the displacement:
∆E=F∆s
And as F = ma:
∆E = ma∆s
As the velocity in time is ∆s and acceleration in time is ∆v:
∆E = m·v·∆v
On the other hand, if we integrate over the changes of v then:
E = ∫ s1s0 m dvds dsdt ds = ∫ v1v0 mvdv = 1/2mv2v1v0
Or simply:
∆E = ½ m∆v2=∆(½ mv2)37
We easily see that how this simple mathematical result stems from understanding 
energy in terms of mv∆v and gives us an integration of ½ mv2. We have done this 
without respecting the limits of Leibnizian methodology as the F = ma concept 
above is Newtonian. We can nonetheless appreciate that the motion of the falling 
body (pendulum) requires that speed changes in time across the duration of the 
fall (acceleration), the simple integration of this path of fall implies the factor of 
½ as a direct result of calculation. At the same time, we can also notice that one 
does not necessarily require the method of integration to achieve the same results. 
Evaluating ∆E through m·v∆v means treating v∆v through average  velocity:
∆s/∆t = (vintial+vfinal)/2
F∆s = m(vfinal–vintial) · (vintial+vfinal)/2
With initial velocity=0 and final velocity=v:
F∆s= mv2/2
37 Approximations here are used to outline reasoning through proportions and dimensions 
where equations outline how the issues might look from the perspective of calculation.
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In either case, what is missing pertains to operational forces (such as Newtonian 
forces) that determine the path of the body with respect to distance (or time) trav-
eled.
The longer, and more Leibnizian, answer requires that we add an additional 
layer of complexity to Leibniz’s example above. We know that the rising pendu-
lum achieves its work by acting against gravity and, in turn, the falling pendu-
lum accumulates speed by accelerating due to the force of gravity. Leibniz’s own 
acknowledgement of Galileo’s law of falling bodies as one of the only principles 
cited in this account in these very passages of the early De Corporum Concursu, 
discussed above, indicates Leibniz’s clear awareness, from an early period, that it 
is acceleration that gives rise to the proportion of linear speed to quadratic height 
(or work).
Now if what Leibniz relies on to provide his argument for mv2 is the notion 
that the maximum velocity of the falling body (pendulum) is the result of the 
acceleration of the body in the duration of fall, it seems unlikely that his cal-
culation would ignore the fact that this maximum velocity should be the inte-
gration of the acceleration of the body in the duration of fall. Indeed, drawing 
from earlier analysis, we know why Leibniz was indifferent to such a calculation 
by integration because Leibniz takes the formula ∆v2∝∆h as the means to under-
stand the pendulum example above. With or without the added coefficient ½, the 
exchange between maximum velocity and maximum height preserves the same 
proportions. Recall that in the previous example we have bodies A and C of equal 
mass, their maximum velocities at 1 unit and 2 units, and their maximum heights 
attained 1 foot and 4 feet, respectively. As such:
For w = mass·height,
wA = 1·1 = 1
wC = 1·4 = 4
For a calculation of mv2, we have
mv2A = 1·1 = 1
mv2C = 1·4 = 4
Hence if we take the energy formula ½ mv2, this does not alter the proportions 
set out by Leibniz, as calculating ½ mv2 we get ½ mv2A = ½ and ½ mv2B = 2. Both 
proportions satisfy the conservation quantity established through ∆v2∝∆h.
Standard responses to this interpretive problem argue that Leibniz was simply 
in the habit of dropping constants in his calculations.38 We find this understand-
ing implicit in much of the important commentaries of Leibniz’s dynamics from 
38 Bertoloni Meli 2002, 153, and Aiton 1972, 257–274 and 264.
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Dugas, Gueroult and, more recently, Duchesneau.39 This coefficient ½ is also 
in principle eliminable from the perspective of the statical method of Leibniz’s 
measurement. Yet without directly contradicting these established commentar-
ies, I argue that we can have a more concrete and systematic understanding of 
this problem in Leibniz by looking at harsher criticisms. In this I follow Szabó’s 
assessment of Leibniz’s vis viva argument as one of systematic failure rather than 
an error due to the convention of calculation.
Szabó’s argument is that Leibniz’s dynamics should never have been called 
that because the latter did not understand (Newtonian) force and the problem of 
vis viva (and its measurement) remained essentially tied to that of statics rather 
than that of dynamics.40 As we saw in our discussion of Leibniz’s pendulum 
examples, the measure given to his conservation principle treated only maximum 
height and the final velocity in geometrical terms, with the extrapolation from this 
methodology that the quadratic increase of height as proportional to the linear 
increase in speed. That is, Leibniz did not describe the path of the fall in algebraic 
terms as a function of force to acceleration. Following Szabó’s rather harsh com-
mentary, we recognize the fact that Leibniz, despite his theoretical intentions for 
a dynamics, remained methodologically limited by the statical means of evalu-
ation. What was ironically lacking from Leibniz’s dynamics was a dynamical view 
of motion. This fact of methodological limitation explains why the integration of 
mvdv into ½mv2 could have escaped Leibniz. It is clear then that the origin of mv2 
does not rely on integration at all and the quantity mvdv was not part of Leibniz’s 
conception. Hence although Leibniz, citing Galileo, explicitly relied on the kine-
matic figure of the path of a falling body accelerating with respect to the duration 
of fall (proportional to height), the way in which the quantity of velocity increases 
in time because of the solicitation of gravitational force is not an aspect of Leib-
nizian dynamics. What is omitted by Leibniz is much more than the constant ½. 
Rather what is omitted from the quantity of vis viva mv2 is the systematic under-
standing of the dynamic problem of the acceleration in time of a falling body due 
to the interplay of gravitational solicitation and inertial resistance.41
39 Cf. Gueroult 1934, 38  f.
40 Szabó 31987, 70  f.
41 This is not due to Leibniz’s ignorance of either Keplerian, Cartesian or Newtonian inertia 
which play a role in the development of Leibniz’s account of vis passiva in the resistance and 
impenetrability of body. I follow Bernstein in holding that Leibniz develops his own idiosyncratic 
view of inertia qua vis insita that relates to the persistence of vis in body rather than the state of 
motion-rest. In this reading Leibniz consciously, rather than confusedly, ignores the Newtonian 
innovation over the Scholastic “inclinatio ad quietem”. See GP VII 280–293; AG 245–250, as well 
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Szabó does not equivocate on how many great minds and how much pre-
cious time was wasted on Leibniz and the eventual vis viva controversy. Yet 
regardless of how we evaluate this period of the formation of classical mechan-
ics, we can nonetheless grasp two different interpretations for this omitted “½”. 
The first interpretation, one that understands Leibniz as making an error, sees 
the omission of the ½ as the error of Leibniz’s measurement of the path of the 
falling body. The second interpretation, one that understands Leibniz as limited 
by his methodology, sees the omission of ½ as a systematic and conceptual limi-
tation. I follow Szabó here in arguing that the omission of ½ in mv2 is a result of 
his limited methodology and from this it is implied that Leibniz was not in error 
about the integration of mvdv as there was simply no integration problem at all. 
But I temper Szabó’s conclusion by maintaining that this methodological limita-
tion does not tell the whole story.
Although Szabó does not go into further detail about his considerations of 
Leibniz’s methodological limitation, one could nonetheless argue against the 
conclusions he draws. Leibniz did in fact consider infinitesimal quantities of 
soliciting “force” in terms of a dynamics. The problem is that Leibniz did not 
engage in his thinking about infinitesimal quantities of “force” in an algebraic 
way. In other words, Leibniz’s scientific method with respect to the mathemati-
zation of dynamics was limited insofar as this dynamic conception of the path of 
the motion of the falling body was not rendered mathematically. The Specimen 
renders this point sufficiently clear. Leibniz argues here that,
[f]rom this it follows that force is also twofold. One force is elementary, which I also call 
dead force, since motion [motus] does not yet exist in it, but only a solicitation to motion 
[motus], as with the ball in the tube, or a stone in a sling while still being held by the rope. 
The other force is ordinary force, joined with actual motion.42
Leibniz’s idea here is that the outward path of the moving body in the tube, as 
motion due to centrifugal force, is the result of a series of impressed solicitations 
to move. In turn, the calculation of the final velocity of a moving body, solicited 
by a constant force, would certainly result from the sum of these transformations 
of velocity in time while receiving such solicitations. He states that,
[J]ust as the numerical value of a motion extending through time derives from an infinite 
number of impetuses, so, in turn, impetus itself (even though it is something momentary) 
as the letter to De Volder from 24 March/3 April 1699, GP II 170; DeV 313; AG 172. Cf. Bernstein 
1981, 97–113. Cf. GP IV 510; AG 161.
42 GM VI 238; AG 121.
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arises from an infinite number of increments successively impressed on a given mobile 
thing. And so impetus too has a certain element from whose infinite repetition it can only 
arise.43
Leibniz here seems to be arguing for a conception of the path of motion that we 
have just set aside. But Leibniz, in the next paragraph remarks further that,
[W]hen we are dealing with impact, which arises from a heavy body which has already been 
falling for some time, or from a bow that has already been restoring its shape for some time, 
or from a similar cause, the force in question is living force which arises from an infinity of 
continual impressions of dead force.44
This problem of the successive impression or nisus on a moving body is correlated 
to the consideration of the moments of the force of gravitation on an accelerat-
ing body. To dispel the alleged errors of integration, I refer to Bertoloni Meli’s 
comment concerning this problem. I follow his argument that,
[w]hen he talks of a ‘heavy body which has been falling for some time’, he does not mean 
that the integral of dead force is multiplied by some element of time, but is simply providing 
a general description of the phenomenon.45
In these terms, Bertoloni Meli argues, as Leibniz himself makes clear, that this 
conception of the infinitesimal-finite difference allows us to compare quantities 
correlated to dead and living force. This comparison, although important for 
understanding how Leibniz conceives of the continuity between dead and living 
force, does not mean that the infinitesimal quantity assigned to dead force inte-
grates into living force. In fact there is no such correlation between the solicita-
tions (nisus) of dead force such as to integrate in mathematical terms into the 
integrated sum of final velocity of a body “falling for some time”. We should thus 
not let the infinitesimal-finite comparison of dead and living forces mislead us 
into thinking that this relation also implies that one integrates into the other.
Through the same interpretation, we can also understand another salient 
remark on this problem found in Leibniz’s letter to De Volder of 27 December 
43 GM VI 239; AG 121.
44 GM VI 238; AG 122. In a different context, Leibniz also argues for the same distinction between 
dead and living force to De Volder in a letter of 27 December 1698. Here Leibniz straightforwardly 
claims that the analogy to the distinction between finite and infinite for the distinction between 
dead and living force is made to argue for the continuity between the terms on the model that 
natura non facit saltum. GP II 154, DeV 286.
45 Bertoloni Meli, 90.
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1698, where Leibniz, on this same subject of the relation between solicitation and 
motion remarks:
Of course the speed increases in equal amounts according to time, but the absolute force 
itself increases according to distance or the square of the times, i.  e., in accordance to the 
effect. So by analogy with geometry, or my analysis, solicitations are as dx, speeds are as x, 
and forces [vires] are as xx or ∫xdx.46
Again here, Leibniz is dealing with the comparability of the kinds of quantities 
involved. Hence rather than analyzing the actual (analytical) relation between 
nisus and motions, or speeds and forces, Leibniz uses his infinitesimal analysis 
analogically to compare the magnitudes. Leibniz exploits here only the linear and 
quadratic difference between speed and vis rather than a dynamic account of the 
path of motion through solicitation.
Leibniz’s failure to provide a mathematical account of the relation between 
soliciting forces and motion further clarifies the limits of his dynamics and the 
incompleteness of his physical theory. Nonetheless we also see that Leibniz 
possessed a conception of what he was unable to formalize. It is in treating the 
gap between Leibniz’s methodological limits and conceptual aims that we shall 
clarify the nature of structural causality in Leibniz’s dynamics.
4  From potentia to actio: Leibniz’s Refinement of 
the vis viva Concept
Our analysis above has interpreted Leibniz’s omission of ½ from mv2 by charac-
terizing this “error” as a methodological limitation. Judging from Leibniz’s own 
arguments, we have established that Leibniz calculates the dynamical properties 
of motion through statical methods. That is, the relation ∆v2∝∆h is inferred from 
a series of statical proportions between maximum speed and “work”, leaving the 
consideration of the acceleration of the path of the motion v∆v (across a distance) 
unaccounted for except in a general description of the phenomenon.
The idea of ‘vindicating’ Leibniz is not my aim here. Rather, I argue that 
treating Leibniz’s omission as a concrete methodological limitation can help us 
separate the different aspects of Leibniz’s dynamics and help us grasp how the 
quantity mv2 functions within his dynamics. We have mentioned briefly above 
that Leibniz’s maturation in the dynamics project consists of a conceptual move 
46 GP II 156; DeV 289.
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beyond the limited methodology of the measurement of vis viva as mv2. Leibniz’s 
methodological limitations, as we have seen, constrain him to a model of meas-
urement that can only take up static proportional relations between maximum 
and final quantities of velocity and height. This model is based on the equipol-
lence between a quantity such as velocity and its “exhaustion” in height. In other 
words, a body’s velocity at a time tn indicates its power or potentia to achieve 
some future effect such as maximum height. The conceptual framework for 
understanding vis viva then is thus the model of the potentia of a certain intensive 
power to achieve some extended motion in its exhaustion: the translation of full 
intensity to completed extension.
The limits of this intensity-extension model can be directly seen in our cri-
tique of Leibniz’s statical methodology. However, in our analysis we have also seen 
Leibniz conceptually reaching beyond these limitations. Although the conserved 
quantity mv2 serves nicely as a treatment of the intensive-extensive equipollence 
between velocity and height ∆v2∝∆h, this quantity mv2 also allows Leibniz to go 
much further. Separating the concrete problems of the measurement of mv2 from 
its eventual structural role in the dynamics will enable us to grasp the true role 
of mv2 as a conserved quantity and see how Leibniz moves beyond a treatment of 
corporeal causation based on the equipollence of intensity and extension.
In what follows I argue for a conceptual distinction between the understand-
ing of vis viva as power (potentia) and as action (actio). Both aspects of vis viva are 
present in Leibniz’s theory but whereas understanding vis viva as power empha-
sizes the concept of intensity (intensio or longitudines) exhausted or otherwise 
translated into another quantity in a moving body through time, actio empha-
sizes the immanent realization or the organization of the properties of a moving 
body at any time tn in temporal evolution. On the one hand, we have seen the limi-
tations of understanding vis viva through the concept of power insofar as Leibniz 
failed to provide some analogous notion of (Newtonian) force where the final 
velocity of the falling body would be the expression of a series of compounded 
attractions (or solicitations to motion) and inertial resistances to these attrac-
tions (or solicitations to motion) in its path of motion. Though Leibniz saw the 
need to describe the expression of power in motion in just this way, it remained 
a vague description far from any direct mathematical treatment of the path of 
the body vdv (across a distance). We could thus say that Leibniz’s methodology 
limits him in the account of understanding vis viva as the translation of intensive 
potentia to extensive motion. On the other hand, understanding the quantity con-
served through the concept of actio would allow us to grasp Leibniz’s conserva-
tion principle through mv2 by another means. Actio allows us to treat vis viva as 
an organizational principle that works structurally over the extended properties 
of corporeal motion. In other words, the conservation principle mv2 would serve 
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to provide a principle of invariance over a field of quantitative transformations 
within a physical system of one or many bodies. As I argue below, Leibniz’s meth-
odological limitations allow us to more coherently grasp the refinement of vis viva 
from the model of potentia than from that of actio, a maturation that makes clear 
the structural nature of dynamical causality.
Before examining actio more closely, we first provide some grounds by first 
briefly looking at the context for this later stage of Leibniz’s dynamics. The major 
transformation of Leibniz’s dynamics project is his turn from a largely a posteriori 
mode of justification to an a priori one. This transformation can be dated to 1690, 
towards the end of the year-long sojourn in Italy (through Austria). I follow Duch-
esneau in seeing the discrepancies between the Phoranomus seu de potentia et 
legibus naturae of 1689 and the Dynamica de potentia et legibus naturae corporeae 
of 1690, written a few months between each other, as definitive in rendering a 
“before and after” picture of this shift.47 Concerning the same transition, Fichant 
notes that the later Dynamica, drawing his title from the Latinized Greek, should 
be understood as a distinct shift towards a new science concerning actio, a turn 
that subordinates previous mechanical concepts such as potentia under a new 
formulation.48 Hence although the title is often referenced as Dynamica de poten-
tia, it should really be Dynamica: de potentia et legibus naturae corporeae. That 
is, in English, “Dynamics: On power and the laws of natural bodies” rather than 
“Dynamics of power and the laws of natural bodies”. The concept of power is sub-
sumed under a new understanding of dynamics through actio. Although Fichant 
makes an alluring case, I am unsure whether, considering the other documents 
of the period, the shift can be made so neatly. Nonetheless, a shift towards the 
privileging of actio is clear around 1690, and although it is difficult to underline 
the exact cause of this shift, roots of it can be traced to the public criticism of his 
earlier published Brevis Demonstratio (1685) by the Cartesians F. Catelan and N. 
Malebranche (1687), a debate later on resumed by D. Papin (1696), and to Leib-
niz’s own increasing critical engagement with the physical theory of Newton’s 
Principia which Leibniz claims only to have actually read in Rome in late 1689.49
Regardless of the fascinating historiographical details here, we shall content 
ourselves with the general context that they provide for the conceptual shift. Now, 
we can see the turn from a posteori to a priori as coinciding with the turn from a 
negative project of the critique and reform of Cartesian mechanism to that of a posi-
47 See Duchesneau 1998, vol. 6, 1  f. and 77–109.
48 See Fichant 1995, 49–81 and 50–53.
49 For an account of the ambiguities concerning the date of Leibniz’s encounter with Newton’s 
Principia see Bertoloni Meli, 8.
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tive project of Leibniz’s own systematic articulation of the laws of motion. Catelan’s 
critique of Leibniz as ignoring the factor of the time of the free fall of bodies in the 
critique of Descartes made clear that the project of “reform” had to reach beyond 
a mere rejection of the conservation of the Cartesian quantity of motion.50 Hence 
Leibniz faced the task of generalizing the basic notions at work in his reform of 
mechanics. Also, an “internal” drive within Leibniz’s own conception of the ideals 
of scientific demonstration during this period meant that the maturation of his 
project should be understood along the methodology of the reciprocal correspond-
ence between an analytic and synthetic mode of demonstration. This turn to an a 
priori presentation can thus be seen as an eventuality resulting from the crystalliza-
tion of Leibniz’s general ideals about the method of scientific argumentation rather 
than from specific mechanical or dynamical problems. As such, while the analytic 
mode of determining the basic elements of dynamics could be developed from a 
modeling of empirical features of motion, only an a priori presentation of these ele-
ments could allow for a synthetic form of demonstration starting from the scientific 
ideal of real, rather than nominal, definitions and a concretely syllogistic form.51
To avoid confusion it is also worth noting that this a priori turn here does not 
mean a demonstration of the laws of motion on the basis of the synthetic a priori 
in Kantian terms. What is a priori about Leibniz’s method cannot be mapped 
onto Kant’s distinction between the a priori and a posteriori but owes its status 
to the earlier Scholastic tradition of distinguishing between argumentation from 
real and nominal definitions. An a priori scientific demonstration, for Leibniz, 
is synthetic because it begins with elemental a priori (real) definitions building 
toward the demonstration of a complex proposition via syllogism. Conversely, an 
a posteriori method for scientific demonstration dissects (analyses) phenomena 
according to nominal definitions.
What then governs this transition between the a posteriori analytic phase and 
the turn to an a priori and synthetic phase is the attempt to solve the problem 
of how to characterize and bridge the difference between causes and effects 
in corporeal motion. The basic model for the analysis of motion in the earlier 
phase was based on the interpretation of the equipollence of cause and effect 
as the extensional expression of a certain intensity (potentia) in motion. That is, 
although vis is non-phenomenal, we can nonetheless measure the “quantity” of 
this intensity, potentia, by comparing the motion of different bodies in order to 
indirectly draw out a proportional relation between them. Hence, the measure of 
50 GP III 41  f.
51 Leibniz provides a clear discussion of the relation between the distinction of real and nomi-
nal definitions and causation in § 24 of his Discours de Métaphysique. GP IV 450.
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the differences between different elements of an a posteriori experiment allows 
us to infer an indirect measure of the causes responsible for these phenomenal 
effects. As such, although the architectonic principle of the equipollence of effect 
and cause is both a priori and essential, the actual account of the laws of motion 
remained dependent on a posteriori elements (nominal): the various proportions 
that hold between empirical effects. In order to overcome this a posteriori orienta-
tion, Leibniz introduced, between the Phoranomus and the Dynamica, the notion 
of actio that would introduce a third term alongside power and effect.52
What does the introduction of actio change in Leibniz’s capacity to render a 
satisfactory account of the laws of motion? We shall examine this in more detail 
below. For the moment we note that the relation between power and effect pro-
vided Leibniz at an earlier phase with the capacity not only to refute the Cartesian 
conservation of quantity of motion but also to indicate that there is something in 
corporeal motion that does not simply reduce to its extensional features. Now, 
although the indication of this non-extensional intensity (potentia) in motion 
allowed Leibniz to argue for something in motion beyond the geometric features 
of size, shape and magnitude, the very treatment of this “something” that is vis, 
remained dependent on the capacity to take a measure of the extensional expres-
sion of vis in motion. These cases depend on what Leibniz called, drawing on 
Aristotelean terminology, “violent” motion, as it is only in cases of, say, collision 
or the exhaustion of motion that quantities such as final velocities and heights, 
could be determined and brought into comparison. This is a direct feature, as we 
have analyzed above, of Leibniz’s methodological limitations. With the notion of 
actio, empirical phenomenal effect is replaced by the concept of an immanent 
activity in corporeal motion that constantly expresses the properties of vis in space 
and time. As such, the measure of actio does not have to rely on the “violent” 
cases of motion as the expression of vis in terms of actio does not require terminal 
maximum measures or the efficient exchange of velocities in collision. We shall 
look at this more closely in the treatment of Leibniz’s Essay de dynamique (circa 
1699–1701) in the following. It is important here to note that the continuous action 
of a moving body in time allows us to take its velocity and work achieved at any 
time tn. Hence actio allows Leibniz to further distance the phenomenal from the 
metaphysical or essential aspects of motion by allowing actio to stand between, 
on the one side, the non-phenonemal causality of vis and, on the other side, the 
phenomenal effects of size, shape and motion.
There is significant overlap between concrete models of potentia and models 
of actio. The use of “early” and “late” here does not correspond, as noted above, 
52 GM VI 291  f.
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to a neat developmental distinction. Nonetheless whereas the earlier model, priv-
ileging the equipollence of effect and cause, made use of empirical measurements 
between effects to make the comparison of causes (vis) and effects (motion) pos-
sible, the later model starts by instantiating vis qua actio in bodies (vis immanent 
in bodies insofar as acting in space and time) and treats effects as the empirical 
expressions of actio. Actions are thus the causes of the properties of motion in a 
system of one or many bodies. With the introduction of actio as the product of 
mass, distance traveled and speed, Leibniz takes a move in a different direction. 
As I will argue, this conception of the quantity of actio steps beyond the static 
model and allows us to interpret the conservation of vis viva as an invariant whose 
role it is to structurally organize these extensional properties of a system of bodies 
in motion and to help to clarify the nature of vis viva as structural cause of motion.
5  Actio and Structural Causation
The Essay de Dynamique (circa 1699–1701) is the last comprehensive contribution 
to Leibniz’s dynamics project. It followed the turn in the mode of presentation 
brought forth after the Dynamica where actio was introduced to provide a new 
presentation of vis in terms of its embodiment in the immanent evolution of cor-
poreal motion in space and time.
Leibniz’s own example from the Essay is complicated and I have simplified it 
here for the sake of clarity. Leibniz here takes an initial system of three bodies A, B 
and C along three axes, M, L and N, respectively. A moves along axis M to strike the 
resting bodies B and C, causing them to move along the axes L and N, respectively. 
Now, as A moves towards the origin to strike the two bodies B and C (at rest), the 
two bodies B and C will move away from the origin and they will move in propor-
tion to the mass, speed and angle of collision of A moving toward the origin.
From this basic scenario, Leibniz adds two additional bodies, D and E, on axes 
L and N, respectively, moving toward the origin. Hence as bodies B and C move 
away from the origin, they will each strike the bodies D and E, respectively. In this 
scenario, after the meeting of bodies BD and bodies CE, B and D will continue in 
the same direction away from the origin while C and E will be rebounded leaving C 
moving back to the origin while E moves away from the origin along axis N.53
53 GM VI 223.
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Fig. 154
54 This figure is redrawn consulting Gerhardt’s figure 22 in the appendix to GM VI. The bod-
ies are color-coded to indicate time. Blue represents the events that occur between t1 and t2. 
Red represents the events that occur between t2 and t3. Grey represents the events that occur 
between t3 and t4 and yellow represents the events after t4. As A remains in the same position 
after t2, no color coding is made.
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Leibniz’s aim here is to take this system of five bodies in order to demonstrate 
an invariance at each time tn as the system evolves. By assigning different speeds 
and masses to each body and in tracking their speeds at time tn, Leibniz seeks to 
make his case for a conservation of what he calls “motive action” (actio motrix 
or action motrice). Rather than enter into the description that Leibniz provides 
at each time tn of the system, perhaps a chart might better serve our purposes 
here. 
Fig. 255
A B C D E
mass 1 1 1 2 ½ 
t1 velocity 0 0 0 0 0
formal effect=mass⋅distance 0 0 0 0 0
actio=formal effect⋅velocity 0 0 0 0 0
t2 velocity √2 0 0 –½ –2/3
formal effect=mass⋅distance √2 0 0 1 2/6
actio=formal effect⋅|velocity| 2 0 0 ½ 2/9
t3 velocity 0 1 1 –½ –2/3
formal effect=mass⋅distance 0 1 1 1 2/6
actio=formal effect⋅|velocity| 0 1 1 ½ 2/9
t4 velocity 0 1/3 –1/9 5/6 14/9
formal effect=mass⋅distance 0 1/3 1/9 5/3 7/9
actio=formal effect⋅|velocity| 0 1/9 1/81 25/18 98/81
The aim of the demonstration is primarily to note that the actio of the system of 
bodies ABCDE as the sum of their respective actio at and after time t2 is invariant, 
the quantity here is 49/18 units.
The example in question also occurs in Leibniz’s mature work on the dynam-
ics in different places. In his correspondence with Bernoulli and De Volder on 27 
December 1698, a simpler version was employed.56 What is important to note is 
55 This chart is created from Leibniz’s argument from GM VI 223–225. Each row of time tn marked 
here represents what happens (immediately) after tn.
56 GP II 159–169; DeV 292–295.
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that the principal crux of his argument with De Volder centered on establishing 
the proportion of the speeds of the three bodies (A, B and C) at various times 
rather than the larger quantitative exposition.
In the Essay de dynamique Leibniz attempts to explain the quantities chosen 
here in detail, but for the sake of simplicity we will stick closely to the aim of 
the argument, the determination of an invariant. However, a few things require 
some explanation. First, in the initial meeting of bodies ABC at the origin, we note 
that the bodies are of equal mass. Hence the speed of body A at t2 is distributed 
between bodies B and C in proportion to the relation of the two equal sides of L 
and M to the hypotenuse. Hence the speed of √2 is split into two speeds (B and C), 
each of 1 unit. This is as if the motion of B and C can be equated to the fragmenta-
tion of the motion of A along two orthogonal axes.
Second, we must note that C rebounds after the meeting of CE at time t3, 
while B and D do not rebound after the meeting of BD. Here, although Leibniz 
does address the problem of elastic and inelastic collisions in his explanation 
following his experimental scenario, he does not address the specific case of the 
meeting of bodies BD. This further problem of elastic collision is not addressed by 
Leibniz. Nonetheless, the general picture seems to be clear. If we take the subset 
of bodies A, B and C, the quantity of motive actio, the invariant, is 2 units after 
collision at t2. If we take the entire set of bodies A, B, C, D and E, the quantity of 
motive actio is 49/18 units across times t2 to t4 (and after) and continue as such 
without the addition of new bodies to the system.
The goal of an invariant calculated in this way allows us to return to the ana-
lysis of mv2 in a different way. We know that as the respective speeds of each 
body in a system are proportional to the distance traveled by each body, the speed 
is also linearly proportional to the “formal effect” of each body considered. As 
such, the quantity mv2 is thus proportional to the quantity of motive actio of each 
body in the system at each time tn. This demonstration in the Essay de dynamique 
was meant to answer those who “persist in disputing this definition of motive 
action”.57 This might refer to De Volder who expressed heavy reservations con-
cerning the calculation of motive actio through the formal effect of motion. In 
his correspondence with Bernoulli and De Volder on 3 April 1699, Leibniz had 
provided the quantity of formal effect as the product of mass and distance.58 As 
distance is the product of velocity and time, the quantity of formal effect is the 
product of mass, velocity and time. The quantity of actio is, in turn, the product 
of mass, time and velocity squared or mv2t. As velocity is distance s over time t, 
57 GM VI 221  f.
58 GP II 172–174. DeV 317  f.
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actio can also be understood as ms2/t. Hence, for the calculation for an invariant 
in a system of bodies in motion, the calculation of mv2 at time tn is equivalent to 
the calculation of actio at time tn. What we know from the analysis of the formula 
can be seen more directly in the following: 
Fig. 3
Sum of various quantities for bodies A, B, C, D and E. 
  formal effect actio mv2
t1 0 0 0
t2 4/3⋅√2 49/18 49/18
t3 10/3 49/18 49/18
t4 26/9 49/18 49/18
What is perhaps most important here is to grasp the difference between this 
invariance of actio and mv2 in light of the non-invariance of the quantity of formal 
effect. Of course, it is clear that formal effect or m⋅s (product of mass and dis-
tance traveled) is not conserved as it evolves as a function of velocity in time. But 
as distance increases and actio remains constant, velocity must then also dimin-
ish at an inversely proportional rate. That is, insofar as actio A can be understood 
as A=m⋅s⋅v, then:
∆A/v≈∆m⋅s
The formal effect m⋅s increases inversely proportional to (diminishing) velocity. 
As such the relation between the invariance of actio and the quantity of formal 
effect translates the conservation of actio into the relation between velocity 
and the instances of the distance traveled of each body in the system in time tn. 
Leibniz does establish something close to a dynamics here. With actio (measured 
by energy-work) as a constant given in a physical system, the formula establishes 
a proportion between the velocity at time tn and the distance s covered at tn. 
This translates the conservation of actio into the proportional (inverse) relation 
between the actual velocity of a system of bodies and their “formal effect” actu-
alized by that moving body at any time tn. Hence the conceptual theme under-
lying this measurement of the proportions between these quantities in terms of 
conserved actio is that which might designate something close to the proportion 
between the quantity of the work achieved by a system and the potential energy 
of each body in the system through its temporal evolution. Of course, the direct 
identification of the system of actio and energy is anachronistic. Nonetheless this 
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perspective of the quantity of actio might allow us some insight into Leibniz’s 
method.
In our examination of potentia, we see that the quantity of conserved vis, 
mv2, was inferred indirectly from a comparison of quantities. Leibniz’s use of 
actio attempted to remove itself from a method of indirect measure of potentia. 
It stands as the quantity regulating the structural translation of potentia and 
effect. Further, the quantity of actio has no direct correlation to the “mechanical” 
notions of external solicitation, internal impetus, static counter-balancing or any 
such physical models; its role is purely a systematic one that concerns the formal 
organization of these proportions in temporal evolution.
The calculation of actio here then provides us with a structural interpreta-
tion of mv2. Our original interpretation of mv2 shifted the emphasis away from 
the quantity as the sum of the moments of forces acting on and in the body as 
it falls and focused on understanding this expression via statics as the propor-
tion of work and maximum velocity. From the analysis of the limits of this stati-
cal method, we saw how this revealed Leibniz’s conceptual aims for a structural 
understanding of vis. This structural understanding is reinforced by seeing how 
Leibniz places the invariance of mv2 at work in a very different kind of example 
where the proportions are not drawn from the exhaustion of intensity into exten-
sion but rather played the role of governing the evolution of the motion, or a 
system of motions, in time. This allows us to clarify Leibniz’s refinement of the 
concept of vis through the structural character of the use of mv2 qua actio and 
emphasize the importance of the status of vis viva as “action” under which the 
concept of “power” is subsumed.
6  Concluding Remarks
As a final note, we acknowledge that, for most of the mature period of Leibniz’s 
metaphysics, he affirmed the scholastic axiom that “actiones sunt supposito-
rum”.59 This notion most famously applies to the metaphysical thesis concern-
ing the containment of predicates (in temporal evolution) for a subject such as 
Julius Cesar, Genghis Khan or, abstractly, the present author; yet, importantly, it 
also concerns the constant action of individual substances. This constant meta-
physical action thus translates into the physical thesis, adopted at least as early 
as circa 1678, of bodies in constant micro-motions and the rejection of “perfect 
59 Leibniz provides a clear exposition of this position in § 8 of the Discours. GP IV 432  f.; AG 40  f. 
The axiom comes directly from Thomas Aquinas, ST II–II 58, Art. 2.
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rest” in bodies.60 Of course this metaphysical notion of action, though metaphys-
ically suggestive of the foundation of the conservation of vis viva, is far from what 
we have considered here. Indeed, Leibniz’s metaphysical concept of actiones 
requires much more investigation in order to make clear its convergence with his 
intended systematic theory of motion.
Leaving the metaphysics of actio aside, we nonetheless have gained some 
clarity on the role of actio in dynamics where it provides a bridge between the 
intensity of vis and the extendedness of motion. Actio plays a direct role in pro-
viding a concrete picture of the causal nature of vis through the demonstration 
of its conservation of the quantity mv2. Whereas the earlier model of cause and 
effect required Leibniz to bring together, for example, a proportional organization 
of colliding speeds or terminal velocities and heights, actio allows Leibniz to treat 
the quantity conserved in a system of moving bodies during their motion at any 
time tn. This allows us to treat a system of bodies in the course of motion with the 
quantity conserved in their motions with respect to their evolutions at given time 
intervals. With the notion of the intensity of force understood as power, on the 
one hand, and a certain expression of that intensity unfolding in terms of dis-
tance traveled by the moving body, on the other hand, actio structurally regulates 
these transformations of intensity and its expression. Most importantly, Leibniz is 
also able to overcome the implication of the simple image of conservation as that 
which translates one quantity into another (maximal height to maximal velocity). 
The conservation of the quantity of actio no doubt applies to these simpler cases 
but generalizes conservation to stand as a structural cause governing the entire 
range of the properties of motions. In conceptual terms, we move from a static 
understanding of the equipollence of cause and effect closer to a dynamic one of 
the expression of action in the path of motion at given time intervals.
Of course, Leibniz did not provide the means to enter into the field of dynam-
ics as we now understand it. But the development of the concept of actio puts the 
interpretation of vis qua cause on the right footing. The measure of vis through its 
conservation plays a structural role that serves to provide the cause of extended 
motion, not as the passing over of one configuration of quantities into another. 
Rather, it structures the extended properties of motion across its activity in time 
with the quantity of actio composed of the properties of a number of bodies in 
a given system. This activity is theorized as actio, the expression of vis as the 
immanent property of a body in space and time. Actio does not transfer between 
bodies but remains conserved across the collisions of bodies, the exhaustion 
of a motion, the motion of a system of bodies (at motion or rest according to a 
60 A IV 267, 1400; LC 249.
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given center of gravity) whether there is or is not contact or “violent” motion. As 
such, the notion of causality at work in Leibniz dynamics, moving from an earlier 
notion of vis and the later notion of actio, is structurally causal rather than redu-
cible to causa efficiens.61
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